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Abstract
We develop a closed-economy DSGE model of the Indian economy and estimate it
by Bayesian Maximum Likelihood methods using Dynare. We build up in stages to
a model with a number of features important for emerging economies in general and
the Indian economy in particular: a large proportion of credit-constrained consumers,
a ¯nancial accelerator facing domestic ¯rms seeking to ¯nance their investment, and
an informal sector. The simulation properties of the estimated model are examined
under a generalized in°ation targeting Taylor-type interest rate rule with forward and
backward-looking components. We ¯nd that, in terms of model posterior probabilities
and standard moments criteria, inclusion of the above ¯nancial frictions and an infor-
mal sector signi¯cantly improves the model ¯t.
JEL Classi¯cation: E52, E37, E58
Keywords: Indian economy, DSGE model, Bayesian estimation, monetary interest
rate rules, ¯nancial frictions.
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In this chapter, we study the business cycle dynamics of the Indian economy through the
lenses of the New Keynesian DGSE framework, both from a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. We develop a closed-economy DSGE model of the Indian economy and esti-
mate it by Bayesian Maximum Likelihood methods using Dynare. We build up in stages
to a model with a number of features important for emerging economies in general and the
Indian economy in particular: a large proportion of credit-constrained consumers, a ¯nan-
cial accelerator facing domestic ¯rms seeking to ¯nance their investment and an informal
sector. The simulation properties of the estimated model are then examined under a gener-
alized in°ation targeting Taylor-type interest rate rule with forward and backward-looking
components.
Understanding business cycle °uctuations is at the core of macroeconomics research.
The need for models that capture the main features of economic activity and help assessing
the role of economic policies has been recognized since the Keynesian tradition of the 50s
and 60s. Though the Lucas critique has exposed some of the early °aws of macroeconomic
modelling in the 70s, recent developments in the macro literature have led to a breed of
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DGSE) models that are micro-founded, display
consistent expectations-formation mechanisms, can be readily estimated and are therefore
appropriate to explain business cycle dynamics from a structural perspective.
The use of DSGE models to analyze business cycles was championed by Kydland and
Prescott (1982), who found that a real business cycle (RBC) model with exogenous tech-
nology shocks helps explaining a signi¯cant portion of the °uctuations in the US economy.
Much of the research in this area has, since then, attempted to uncover and understand
other potential sources of business cycle °uctuations. This led to several extensions to the
basic Kydland-Prescott RBC model, both in the form of additional, di®erent shocks and
nominal frictions, the latter introducing a (new) Keynesian °avour to the RBC approach.1
Indeed, there is a substantial body of literature devoted to understanding business cycle
dynamics in developed economies, where DSGE models have been found to provide good
empirical ¯t and forecasting performance (see Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007), among others). However, research focusing on
emerging economies is relatively sparser. Data limitations have often been identi¯ed as a
cause, but the real challenge is to provide sensible explanations for the markedly distinct
observed °uctuations in these economies.
In fact, some stylized facts may be pointed out: i) output growth tends to be subject
to larger swings in developing countries; ii) private consumption, relative to income, is
substantially more volatile; iii) terms of trade and output are strongly positively correlated,
while real interest rates and output/net exports display large countercyclicality relative to
1Thus Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) add demand shocks to the standard RBC model, Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) allow for ¯nancial frictions, while Christiano et al. (2005)
include nominal rigidities, just to name a few contributions.
1developed economies; iv) capital in°ows are subject to dramatic \sudden stops" (see Agenor
et al. (2000), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005), for example).
By sharing some of these characteristics, India provides a particularly interesting chal-
lenge for macroeconomic modelling. From the early 90s, high growth rates were accom-
panied by a signi¯cant wave of trade and ¯nancial liberalization, with high-growth and
highly-skilled services and exports sectors co-existing with a sizeable informal, low-skilled
labour intensive sector. Given the stage of development of India's ¯nancial sector, frictions
of this nature, a®ecting both ¯rms and households, may be greatly exacerbated in adverse
conditions. Such a scenario implies that policymakers, in their quest for price and ¯nancial
stability, face extra signi¯cant trade-o®s when setting monetary conditions in response to
shocks. This, in turn, requires careful investigation of the mechanisms that contribute to
the propagation and ampli¯cation of economic and ¯nancial shocks hitting the economy.
This study aims to integrate some of these distinct features within a framework that
provides a convenient way of taking the models to the data. First, we introduce a standard
DSGE model with typical New Keynesian frictions, in the form of imperfect competition,
sticky prices and investment adjustment costs. We show how to augment the baseline
model with additional frictions in order to re°ect the characteristics of the Indian econ-
omy. In particular, we explore the presence of ¯nancial frictions in the form of a ¯nancial
accelerator mechanism as in Bernanke et al. (1999) and liquidity constrained consumers.
Moreover, we further develop the model by allowing for the existence of a formal and a
less capital-intensive informal sector, producing distinct goods with di®erent technologies
sold at di®erent prices. This phenomenon is particularly important in emerging economies,
given their high degrees of informal labour and ¯nancial services and the implications these
have for the e®ectiveness of macroeconomic policy (see Batini et al. (2010b) for a recent
survey).
Then, using data on four key macroeconomic variables (output, investment, in°ation
and interest rates), we ¯rst explore the di®erences in business cycle dynamics between
a developed economy (the US) and India, as captured by the baseline New Keynesian
DSGE model. We subsequently investigate the empirical success of the competing models
in explaining the main stylized facts of the Indian business cycle. We do so by employing
Bayesian system estimation techniques, in the vein of Smets and Wouters (2003), Smets
and Wouters (2007) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004) (for a survey, see
Fernandez-Villaverde, 2009). To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst study that estimates a
model with a formal-informal sectors distinction.
We take a Bayesian approach for several reasons. First, these procedures, unlike full
information maximum likelihood, for example, allow us to use prior information to iden-
tify key structural parameters. In addition, the Bayesian methods employed here utilize
all the cross-equation restrictions implied by the general equilibrium set-up, which makes
estimation more e±cient when compared to the partial equilibrium approaches. More-
over, Bayesian estimation and model comparison are consistent even when the models are
2misspeci¯ed, as shown by Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004).2 Finally, this
framework provides a straightforward method of evaluating the ability of the models in
capturing the cyclical features of the data, while allowing for a fully structural approach to
analyse the sources of °uctuations in the Indian economy.
We ¯nd that a model incorporating ¯nancial frictions and a formal-informal sector
distinction ¯ts the data well and delivers sensible structural parameter estimates. This, in
our opinion, should constitute the ¯rst step in the construction of models suitable for the
systematic analysis of policy actions.
Indeed, the role of ¯scal policy cannot be properly understood, discussed and assessed
unless these speci¯c features, of which we provide a basic framework, are taken into account.
Concurrently, monetary policy in India is di±cult to encapsulate in conventional policy
rules, given the broad scope of the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) mandate (controlling
in°ation, managing pressures on the exchange rate and coping with capital °ows). We
discuss how a generalized policy rule can be used to capture (and evaluate) the RBI stance,
our results suggesting that India's monetary authority policy actions appear to aggressively
target expected in°ation, albeit at a short term horizon.
Thus, in the next section, we describe a baseline New Keynesian DSGE and estimate
it with US and Indian data, illustrating the di®erences between these two economies. In
section 3, we introduce liquidity constrained consumers and a ¯nancial accelerator mecha-
nism into the baseline model. Then, in section 4, we develop a two-sector model allowing
for informality and compare the empirical performance of the competing models. The ¯nal
section summarizes our ¯ndings and points directions for further study.
2 A Standard NK Model
This section develops a standard New Keynesian (NK) DSGE model without any features we
associate with emerging economies. To give us a preliminary insight into what is di®erent
about an emerging economy such as India, this benchmark model is then estimated by
Bayesian methods using both Indian and US data.
2.1 The RBC Core
Every NK DSGE model has at its core a real business cycle model, describing the inter-
temporal problems facing consumers and ¯rms and de¯ning what would happen in the
absence of the various Keynesian frictions. We ¯rst de¯ne a single-period utility for the
representative agent in terms of consumption, Ct, and leisure, Lt, as








2This is an important methodological point, given that the models discussed in this paper, by focusing
only on the closed economy and therefore omitting open economy features, are inherently `misspeci¯ed'.
3In this utility function ¾ ¸ 1 is a risk-aversion parameter which is also the inverse of the
inter-temporal rate of substitution. The parameter % 2 (0;1) de¯nes the relative weight
households place on consumption and this form of utility is compatible with a balanced
growth steady state for for all ¾ ¸ 1.3 For later use, we write down the marginal utilities
of consumption and leisure as, respectively,


















where ¯ is the discount factor. In a stochastic environment, the household's problem at
time t is to choose state-contingent plans for consumption fCtg, leisure, fLtg and holdings
of ¯nancial savings to maximize ­t given its budget constraint in period t
Bt+1 = Bt(1 + Rt) + Wtht ¡ Ct (5)
where Bt is the net stock of real ¯nancial assets at the beginning of period t, Wt is the real
wage rate and Rt is the real interest rate paid on assets held at the beginning of period t.
Hours worked are ht = 1 ¡ Lt and the total amount of time available for work or leisure is
normalized at unity. The ¯rst-order conditions for this optimization problem are




Equation (6) is the Euler consumption function: it equates the current marginal utility of
consumption with the discounted marginal of consumption of a basket of goods in period
t + 1 enhanced by the interest on savings. Thus, the household is indi®erent as between
consuming 1 unit of income today or 1+Rt+1 units in the next period. Equation (7) equates
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure with the real wage, the
relative price of leisure. This completes the household component of the RBC model.
Turning to the production side, we assume that output Yt is produced by the rep-
resentative competitive ¯rm using hours, ht and beginning-of-period capital Kt with a
Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = F(At;ht;Kt) = (Atht)®K1¡®
t (8)
3See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), chapter 9.
4where At is a technology parameter and Yt, ht and Kt are all in per-capita (household) units.
Assume ¯rst that capital can adjust instantly without investment costs. Then equating the
marginal product of labour with the real wage and the marginal product of capital with its





FK;t = (1 ¡ ®)
Yt
Kt
= Rt + ± (10)
Let investment in period t be It. Then capital accumulates according to
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + It (11)
The RBC model is then completed with an output equilibrium equating supply and demand
Yt = Ct + It + Gt (12)
where Gt is government spending on services assumed to be formed out of the economy's
single good and by a ¯nancial market equilibrium. In this model, the only asset accumulated
by households as a whole is capital, so the latter equilibrium is simply Bt = Kt. Substituting
into the household budget constraint (5) and using the ¯rst-order conditions (9) and (10),
and (11) we end up with the output equilibrium condition (12). In other words, equilibrium
in the two factor markets and the output market implies equilibrium in the remaining
¯nancial market, which is simply a statement of Walras' Law.
Now let us introduce investment costs. It is convenient for the later development of
the model to introduce capital producing ¯rms that at time t convert It of output into
(1¡S(Xt))It of new capital sold at a real price Qt and at a cost (that was absent before) of
S(Xt). Here, Xt ´ It
It¡1 and the function S(¢) satis¯es S0; S00 ¸ 0; S(1+g) = S0(1+g) = 0
where g is the balanced-path growth rate. Thus, investment costs are convex and disappear




Dt;t+k [Qt+k(1 ¡ S (It+k=It+k¡1))It+k ¡ It+k]
where Dt;t+k ´ ¯
¤C;t+k
¤C;t is the real stochastic discount rate and
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + (1 ¡ S(Xt))It (13)
This results in the ¯rst-order condition









4Thus Yt = Wtht + (Rt + ±), the zero-pro¯t condition for the competitive ¯rm.
5Demand for capital by ¯rms must satisfy










In (15) the right-hand-side is the gross return to holding a unit of capital in from t to t+1.
The left-hand-side is the gross return from holding bonds, the opportunity cost of capital
and includes an exogenous risk-premium shock RPSt, which, for now, we leave unmodelled.
We complete the set-up with investment costs by de¯ning the functional form
S(X) = ÁX(Xt ¡ (1 + g))2 (16)
The RBC model we have set out de¯nes a equilibrium in output, Yt, consumption Ct,
investment It, capital stock Kt and factor prices, Wt for labour and Rt for capital, and the
price of capital Qt, given exogenous processes for technology At, government spending Gt
and the risk premium shock RPSt.
2.2 From RBC to NK
The NK framework combines the DSGE characteristics of RBC models with frictions such as
monopolistic competition - in which ¯rms produce di®erentiated goods and are price-setters,
instead of a Walrasian determination of prices, and nominal rigidities, in which ¯rms face
constraints on the frequency with which they are able to adjust their prices. Therefore,
we now introduce a monopolistically competitive retail sector that uses a homogeneous







where ³ is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations for each











1¡³ is the aggregate price index. A competitive capital-
producing sector is modelled as for the RBC model
Conversion of good m from a homogeneous output requires a cost cY W
t (m) where whole-
sale production uses the production technology (8). Thus





6To introduce price stickiness, we assume that there is a probability of 1 ¡ » at each
period that the price of each intermediate good m is set optimally to P0
t (m). If the price
is not re-optimized, then it is held ¯xed.5 For each intermediate producer m, the objective
is at time t to choose fP0







t (m) ¡ Pt+kMCt+k
¤
(21)
subject to (18), where Dt;t+k is now the nominal stochastic discount factor over the interval













In (22) we have introduced a mark-up shock MSt to the steady state mark-up 1
(1¡1=³). By





t + (1 ¡ »)(P0
t+1)1¡³ (23)
In setting up the model for simulation and estimation, it is useful to represent the
price dynamics as di®erence equations. Using the fact that for any summation St ´
P1
k=0 ¯kXt+k, we can write
St = Xt +
1 X
k=1
¯kXt+k = Xt +
1 X
k0=0
¯k0+1Xt+k0+1 putting k0 = k + 1
= Xt + ¯St+1 (24)
and de¯ning here the nominal discount factor by Dt;t+k ´ ¯
¤C;t+k=Pt+k




























5Thus we can interpret
1
1¡» as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
72.3 The Central Bank
Following the current practice of central banks in developed economies, it is customary to
assume that setting the nominal interest rate is the main instrument of monetary policy
and, hence, this is modelled by some form of interest rate rule. Nominal and real interest
rates are related by the Fischer equation






where the nominal interest rate Rn;t, set at the beginning of period t, is a policy variable,

















As mentioned in the introduction, that is not necessarily the case of the RBI. In fact,
we will model monetary policy in a more general way by formulating a Calvo-type forward-



















where ²MPS;t is a monetary policy shock and
log©t = log¦t + ¿ log©t¡1 (32)
'Et[log£t+1] = log£t ¡ (1 ¡ ')log(¦t) (33)
The Calvo rule can be interpreted as a feedback from expected in°ation (the µlog £t
£
term) and past in°ation (the Álog ©t
© term) that continues at any one period with proba-
bilities ' and ¿, switching o® with probabilities 1¡' and 1¡¿. The probability of the rule
lasting for h periods is (1 ¡ ')'h, hence the mean forecast horizon is (1 ¡ ')
P1
h=1 h'h =
'=(1 ¡ '). With ' = 0:5, for example, we would have a Taylor rule with one period lead
in in°ation (h = 1). Similarly, ¿ can be interpreted as the degree of backward-lookingness
of the monetary authority.
This rule can also be seen as a special case of a Taylor-type rule that targets h-step-ahead
(back) expected rates of in°ation and past in°ation rates (with h = 1;2;:::;1)
it = ½it¡1 + µ0¼t + µ1Et¼t+1 + µ2Et¼t+2 + ::: + °1¼t¡1 + °2¼t¡2 + :::; (34)
albeit one that imposes a speci¯c structure on the µi's and °i's (i.e., a weighted average of fu-
ture and past variables with geometrically declining weights).6 This has an intuitive appeal









, to simplify notation.
8and interpretation, re°ecting monetary policy in an uncertain environment: the more dis-
tant the h-step ahead forecast, the less reliable it becomes, hence the less weight it receives.
In turn, past in°ation has a typical Koyck-lag structure. Levine et al. (2007) demonstrate
that a strict in°ation forecast based (IFB) Calvo rule is less susceptible to indeterminacy
and has better stabilization properties than conventional IFB rules. These authors show,
in particular, that if such rule is formulated in di®erence form, the indeterminacy probem
disappears altogether.
Note that we are approximating the behaviour of the central bank with an instrument
rule, rather than assuming that the monetary authority optimizes a speci¯c loss function.
Despite the lack of a substantial body of evidence for the Indian case, the forward-backward-
looking Calvo-type formulation can be useful to analyse the RBI's interest rate setting
behaviour. Bhattacharya et al. (2010), using VAR methods, ¯nd monetary policy in India
to have weak transmission channels. On the other hand, however, Virmani (2004) reports
on the potential forward/backward looking behaviour of the RBI using instrumental rules,
suggesting that a backward-looking rule explains the data well. Our proposal nests both
types of behaviour and can therefore shed light on their relative importance.
2.4 Shock processes
The structural shock processes in log-linearized form are assumed to follow AR(1) processes
logAt ¡ log ¹ At = ½A(logAt¡1 ¡ log ¹ At¡1) + ²A;t
logGt ¡ log ¹ Gt = ½G(logGt¡1 ¡ log ¹ Gt¡1) + ²G;t
logMSt ¡ logMS = ½MS(logMSt¡1 ¡ logMS) + ²MS;t
logRPSt ¡ logRPS = ½RPS(logRPSt¡1 ¡ logRPS) + ²RPS;t
where MS = RPS = 1 in the steady state (so logMS = logRPS = 0), while the driving
shocks ²i;t for i = A, G, MS, RPS are assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean. ¹ At and ¹ Gt are
balanced-growth paths at a growth rate g with
¹ Gt
¹ Yt ¯xed. This completes the speci¯cation
of the benchmark NK model.
2.5 Bayesian Estimation for US and India
We now present estimates of the model discussed above for the US and the Indian economies.
This exercise allows us: i) to evaluate how well a baseline New Keynesian DSGE model
¯ts Indian data, and ii) to highlight some of the distinctive traits between a much studied
developed economy and India. For estimation purposes we linearize about a zero in°ation
balanced growth steady state. This is set out for the more general model of section 3 with
¯nancial frictions which reduces to the standard model of this section when the latter are
removed. Next, we brie°y describe the estimation methods used in this chapter.
92.5.1 Bayesian Methods
Bayesian estimation entails obtaining the posterior distribution of the model's parameters,






where p(µ) denotes the prior density of the parameter vector µ, L(Y Tjµ=) is the likelihood of
the sample Y T with T observations (evaluated with the Kalman ¯lter) and
R
L(Y Tjµ)p(µ) is
the marginal likelihood. Since there is no closed form analytical expression for the posterior,
this must be simulated.
One of the main advantages of adopting a Bayesian approach is that it facilitates a formal
comparison of di®erent models through their posterior marginal likelihoods, computed using
the Geweke (1999) modi¯ed harmonic-mean estimator. For a given model mi 2 M and

















is the data density for
model mi given parameter vector µ. To compare models (say, mi and mj) we calculate
the posterior odds ratio which is the ratio of their posterior model probabilities (or Bayes
Factor when the prior odds ratio,
p(mi)















in terms of the log-likelihoods. Components (37) and (38) provide a framework for com-
paring alternative and potentially misspeci¯ed models based on their marginal likelihood.
Such comparisons are important in the assessment of rival models, as the model which
attains the highest odds outperforms its rivals and is therefore favoured.
Given Bayes factors, we can easily compute the model probabilities p1;p2;¢ ¢ ¢;pn for n
models. Since
Pn
i=1 pi = 1 we have that 1
p1 =
Pn
i=2 BFi;1, from which p1 is obtained. Then
pi = p1BF(i;1) gives the remaining model probabilities.
2.5.2 Data, Priors and Calibration
To estimate the system for each economy, we use four macroeconomic observables at quar-
terly frequency. For the US, we use real GDP, real investment, the GDP de°ator and
the nominal interest rate. All data are taken from the FRED Database available through
the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis and the sample period is 1980:1-2006:4. We use the
10corresponding four observables for the Indian economy, covering the period from the ¯rst
quarter of 1996 and the last quarter of 2008 and taken from the IFS and RBI database.
The in°ation rate is calculated on the Wholesale Price Index (WPI), which includes food,
fuel and manufacturing indices. The interest rate is measured by the 91-day Treasury Bill
rate, in order to capture the combined e®ect of the RBI policy rates and liquidity changes
brought about by the Bank sterilization interventions (see Bhattacharya et al. (2010)). A
time series for investment is only available at the annual frequency. Thus, we use the inter-
polation techniques suggested by Litterman (1983) to obtain quarterly data based on the
Index of Industrial Production (IIP) for capital goods.7 For GDP, data is available from
1996:4 onwards, so we interpolate the ¯rst few initial periods from annual data, using the
IIP.
Since the variables in the model are measured as deviations from a constant steady
state, the US GDP and investment are simply de-trended against a linear trend in order to
obtain approximately stationary data. In the case of India, however, a quadratic trend is
required to ensure stationarity.8 Real variables are measured in logarithmic deviations from
the respective trends, in percentage points, while in°ation and the nominal interest rate
are demeaned and expressed as quarterly rates. The corresponding measurement equation








































In order to implement Bayesian estimation, it is ¯rst necessary to de¯ne prior distri-
butions for the parameters. A few structural parameters are kept ¯xed in the estimation
procedure, in accordance with the usual practice in the literature (see Table 1). This is
done so that the calibrated parameters re°ect steady state values of the observed variables.
For the US, we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) in de¯ning the priors for the estimated
parameters and calibrated parameters.9 In the case of India, for instance, ¯ is set at 0.9823,
corresponding to an interest rate of 7% (matching its sample mean), while ± = 0:025 is a
common choice for the depreciation rate. In turn, the investment adjustment cost parameter
ÁX is set at 2.
The choice of priors for the estimated parameters is usually determined by the theoretical
7The Bayesian system estimation techniques used in our study can easily handle variables measured with
imprecision, by introducing stochastic measurement errors. Exploratory analysis revealed that measurement
errors are a negligible source of uncertainty in our estimated models and we therefore focus on estimation
results without measurement errors.
8Removing a quadratic trend from the US data or employing the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter for both countries
delivers time series with similar behaviour and estimation results are qualitatively, and quantitatively, very
close.
9The prior means for the standard deviation of government spending and markup shocks are re-scaled
based on the di®erences in model setups.
11implications of the model and evidence from previous studies. However, as noted in the
introduction, estimated DSGE models for emerging economies, and India in particular, are
scarce, though one might infer potential priors by comparing the features and stylized facts
of developed and developing economies. In general, inverse gamma distributions are used
as priors when non-negativity constraints are necessary, and beta distributions for fractions
or probabilities. Normal distributions are used when more informative priors seem to be
necessary. In some cases, we use the same prior means as in previous studies (Levin et al.
(2006), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007), for example), but choose
larger standard deviations, thus imposing less informative priors and allowing for the data to
determine the parameters' location. The ¯rst four columns of Table 3 provide an overview of
the priors used for each model variant described below in the case of India. For consistency
and comparability, all priors are the same across di®erent speci¯cations.
The risk aversion parameter ¾ allows signi¯cant room for manoeuvre, with a normal
prior de¯ned with a mean of 2 and standard deviation of 0.5. The beta prior density for %
is centred in the midpoint of the unit interval with a standard deviation of 0.2, while the
Calvo-pricing parameter » has a mean of 0.75 and standard deviation of 0.1 as in Smets
and Wouters (2007), implying a contract length of 4 quarters. The labour share ® has a
normal prior with mean 0.8 (approximately its steady state value10), while ³ has a mean of
7 with a standard deviation of 0.5.
For the policy parameters, priors were chosen so that a large domain is covered, re°ecting
the lack of knowledge of the RBI reaction function. We choose beta distributions for the
parameters that should be constrained between 0 and 1, namely the smoothing coe±cient
½ (centred around 0.75 with a standard deviation of 0.1) and the forward-backward looking
parameters ' and ¿, with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2, a relatively di®use
prior. The feedback parameters µ and Á have normal priors with a mean of 2 and a standard
error of 1, thus covering a relatively large parameter space.
The shock processes are the likeliest elements to di®er from previous studies based on
the US economy. Adolfson et al. (2008), for example, argue for choosing larger prior means
for shock processes when analyzing a small open developed economy (Sweden). In the case
of India, it is natural to expect signi¯cantly larger swings in the macro observables and the
prior means for the standard errors are therefore set at 3 (3.5 for the risk premium shock,
higher than the US), using an inverted gamma distribution.
2.5.3 Posterior Estimates
The joint posterior distribution of the estimated parameters is obtained in two steps. First,
the posterior model and the Hessian matrix are obtained via standard numerical optimiza-
tion routines. The Hessian matrix is then used in the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to
10We chose not to calibrate ® to its steady state value and instead freely estimate this parameter. The
proximity of the estimated values for ® will provide additional indications regarding the quality of the ¯t
for each model.
12generate a sample from the posterior distribution. Two parallel chains are used in the
MCMC-MH algorithm and in all the estimations reported in this paper, the univariate
diagnostic statistics produced by Dynare indicate convergence by comparing between and
within moments of multiple chains (Brooks and Gelman (1998)).
Thus, 100,000 random draws (though the ¯rst 30% `burn-in' observations are discarded)
from the posterior density are obtained via the MCMC-Metropolis Hastings algorithm
(MH), with the variance-covariance matrix of the perturbation term in the algorithm be-
ing adjusted in order to obtain reasonable acceptance rates (between 20%-40%).11 The
estimation results for the US report the Bayesian inference in Table 2. Table 3, fourth
column, reports posterior means of all estimated parameters using the Indian data, along
with the approximate 95% con¯dence intervals based on the approximate posterior standard
deviation obtained from the inverse Hessian at the posterior mode.
As shown in Table 2, the estimation results are plausible and are generally similar
to those of Levin et al. (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2007) for the US. In particular,
the posterior mean estimates for the Calvo price-setting parameter, », imply an average
price contract duration of around 2.5 quarters, similar to the ¯ndings of Christiano et al.
(2005), Levin et al. (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2007). It is interesting to note that the
risk-aversion parameter (¾) is estimated to be slightly greater than assumed in the prior
distribution, indicating that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (proportional to
1=¾) is estimated to be about 0.54 in the US, which is plausible as suggested in much
of RBC literature. As usual, monetary policy disturbances (²MPS) are less important in
driving in°ation and output in the US.
As expected, the policy rule estimates imply a fairly strong response (µ) to expected
in°ation by the US Fed Reserve and the degree of interest rate smoothing (½) is fairly
strong. Our posterior results also suggest that the point estimates of the policy reaction to
past in°ation appear small, which is in line with our prior belief. The estimated degree of
backward lookingness is well below the prior mean, further suggesting that the practice of
the Fed is consistent with a substantial degree of forward-looking behaviour. This reinforces
previous ¯ndings in the literature, in particular Gabriel et al. (2009).
Turning to the estimates for India, the estimated » is well below its prior of 0.75,
suggesting that ¯rms adjust prices quite frequently, between 1 and 3 quarters, and implying
only mild price stickiness. Similarly, the estimated model undershoots ®, suggesting a
labour share of 62%. Note, however, that structural parameters like ¾ and ³ deviate little
from their prior means, in fact the posterior distributions overlap with the prior ones, which
might suggest that the data is not very informative about these parameters. %, on the other
hand, is pinned down with better precision at around 0.4.
In terms of the policy parameters, we ¯nd a substantial degree of policy inertia, with
½ reaching 0.81. More importantly, the estimated Calvo rule seems to suggests that the
RBI sets interest rates reacting strongly to expected in°ation (with the feedback coe±cient
11See Schorfheide (2000) for more details.
13µ larger than 1.5), but less so to in°ationary pressures associated with past in°ation, as
captured by Á. However, both µ and Á are estimated imprecisely, the latter not being
statistically signi¯cant. The degree of forward (backward) lookingness measured by ' (¿)
is close to the prior value of 0.5, corresponding to 1 quarter.
Estimation of the shock processes delivers interesting results. First, the shocks appear
to be persistent, but less so than for the US. Secondly, the estimated standard deviations
are larger than the US, in accordance with the macro volatility stylized facts typically
associated with emerging economies. Most strikingly, the standard error associated with
the government spending shock reaches a value above 7, while the risk premium shock
standard deviation is also high. The remaining standard deviations are somewhat below
the speci¯ed priors.
Overall, the estimated baseline model reveals some useful insights: it correctly predicts
that the Indian economy is subject to more volatile shocks, prices appear to be more °exible
for India than for the in US and that aggressive expected in°ation targeting seems to be
consistent with the behaviour of the monetary authorities. In the next two sections, we
investigate further re¯nements and assess their empirical validity, providing a more thorough
comparison of the di®erent speci¯cations under study.
3 A NK Model with Financial Frictions
We now introduce two ¯nancial frictions: liquidity constrained `rule of thumb' consumers
and a ¯nancial accelerator for ¯rms. The inclusion of these features is particularly relevant,
not only because it acknowledges powerful transmission mechanisms of shocks in emerging
economies, but it also helps to conceptualize and understand events such as the 2008 global
¯nancial crisis and subsequent economic slowdown. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke
et al. (1999) and Gertler et al. (2003), for example, stress the importance of ¯nancial
frictions in the ampli¯cation of both real and nominal shocks to the economy, namely in
the form of the ¯nancial accelerator, linking the cost of borrowing and ¯rms' net worth.
Consider ¯rst the existence of liquidity constrained consumers. Suppose that a propor-
tion ¸ of consumers are credit constrained and have no income from monopolistic retail





The remaining Ricardian consumers are modelled as before and consume C2;t. Total con-
sumption is then
Ct = ¸C1;t + (1 ¡ ¸)C2;t (41)
We can model the risk premium rigorously and ¯nancial stress by introducing a ¯nancial
accelerator. The main ingredient is an external ¯nance premium £t such that when the
14¯rm equates the expected return with the expected cost of borrowing we have








is our chosen functional form. In (43), Nt is net worth and Qt¡1Kt ¡ Nt is the external
¯nancing requirement. Thus
Qt¡1Kt¡Nt
Nt is the leverage ratio and thus (42) and (43) state
that the cost of capital is an increasing function of this ratio. Bernanke et al. (1999), in a
costly veri¯cation model, show that the optimal ¯nancial contract between a risk-neutral
intermediary and entrepreneur takes the form of a risk premium given by (43). Thus the
risk premium is an increasing function of leverage of the ¯rm. Following these authors, in
the general equilibrium we ignore monitoring costs.
We now introduce entrepreneurs who own the capital of wholesale ¯rms and who exit
with a given probability 1 ¡ »e. Then the net worth accumulates according to
Nt+1 = »eVt + (1 ¡ »e)De
t (44)
where De
t are transfers from exiting to newly entering entrepreneurs continuing, and Vt, the
net value carried over from the previous period, is given by
Vt = (1 + Rk;t)Qt¡1Kt ¡ £t(1 + Rt)(Qt¡1Kt ¡ Nt) (45)
where Rk;t is the ex post return given by







Kt + (1 ¡ ±)Qt
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(46)
Demand for capital is then given by



















must be added to total consumption. The full model is summarized in Appendix A with
the previous model as a special case.
153.1 Bayesian Estimation for India
The model with ¯nancial frictions de¯nes extra parameters which we now try to estimate for
India. These are the proportion of liquidity constrained consumers ¸, the elasticity of the
external ¯nance premium with respect to leverage Â in (43), the entrepreneurs survival rate
»e and the leverage ratio nk. Additionally, the model depends on the ¯nancial accelerator
risk premium parameter £, which we choose to calibrate at 1.01 (additional sensitivity
analysis suggests that other reasonable values for £ delivers similar results).
Thus, we maintain the priors used for the baseline model and de¯ne additional priors
for newly estimated parameters. In the case of Â, we assume an inverse gamma with a
mean of 0.05, following Bernanke et al. (1999). Given that the remaining parameters are
expected to be between 0 and 1, we use beta distributions. For ¸, we assume that 40% of
households in India are unable to optimize their consumption, with standard error of 0.1.12
We follow Gertler et al. (2003) in setting the mean of »e equal to 0.93, with a standard
deviation of 0.05. For the leverage ratio parameter nk, required to set k in (43), we choose
the midpoint of the unit interval, with a standard deviation of 0.1.
The sixth column of Table 3 contains the posterior estimates of the model discussed
above. First, the improvement in model ¯t is signi¯cant. The log marginal density is now
-356.3, which corresponds to a Bayes factor of nearly 15, with a posterior model probability
of 94%. This means that the data indicates that adding the ¯nancial frictions discussed in
this section is indispensable.
The added parameters are all statistically signi¯cant, estimated with reasonable pre-
cision and within the expected bounds, apart from ¸. Indeed, the proportion of liquidity
constrained households is found to be around 20%, somewhat below our prior.
Nevertheless, the quality of this model can also be gauged by analyzing the parameters
estimated previously. In general, estimates are more precise and sensible. ®, for instance,
is now retrieved with great accuracy, with its estimate nearly coinciding with the long run
average in the data. Importantly, the parameters of the estimated Calvo-type interest rate
feedback rule imply that the RBI assigns a larger weight to in°ation, both expected and
past, with values of 2.42 and 1.64 for µ and Á, respectively. The corresponding forward-
backward looking horizons, given by ' and ¿ remain similar to the previous model, though.
12There is an important connection between the size of non-Ricardian households (¸) and model inde-
terminacy. For instance, Gali et al. (2004) ¯nd that the presence of non-Ricardian consumers may alter
dramatically the properties of simple interest rules using an otherwise standard NK model. In particular,
one of their main results is that the size of the in°ation coe±cient that is required in order to rule out mul-
tiple equilibria is an increasing function of the weight of rule-of-thumb consumers in the economy. Following
Gali et al. (2004), we carry out a number of simulations using a standard NK model with rule-of-thumb
consumers and a Taylor-type interest rate. Based on a set of conventional parameter values, our simulation
results indeed con¯rm that the size of ¸ is an increasing function of the in°ation coe±cient µ. For a set of
µ = [1:5;2;3;15], the threshold values of ¸ must be around 0.30, 0.31, 0.32, 0.40, respectively, in order to
guarantee the uniqueness of system equilibrium. When ¸ takes a high value under such a rule, the size of
µ required for the avoidance of indeterminacy may be too large to be credible. For this reason, we choose
a truncated prior for ¸ that has an upper bound of 0.4 in this and following sections. The detailed set of
simulation results is available upon request.
16Another distinct feature is the persistence of the exogenous shocks, now estimated to
be higher, though not for the mark-up shock. The associated standard errors are somewhat
smaller, in particular the risk premium shock, perhaps re°ecting the model's ability to
capture additional uncertainty. Nevertheless, they are still high when compared to the ones
found in the literature in the case of developed economies. Note, however, that the Calvo
probability » is still below the prior, again indicating a large frequency of price adjustments
(every 1-2 quarters).
4 A Two-Sector NK Model with an Informal Sector
We now consider a two-sector \Formal" (F) and \Informal" (I) economy, producing dif-
ferent goods with di®erent technologies which sell at di®erent retail prices, PF;t and PI;t,
say. Monopolistic competition prevails in both I and F retail sectors. In the competitive
wholesale sectors, labour and capital are the variable factor inputs and the informal sector
is less capital intensive. The capital-producing sector is competitive as before. Both capital
goods and government services are provided solely from the formal sector and the latter
are ¯nanced by an employment tax. Thus, unlike the previous two models, taxes are now
distortionary. In the general set-up, this can be shared by the formal and informal sectors,
giving us a framework in which the role of tax incidence can be studied as one of the drivers
of informality. The other drivers in our model are the degree of real wage rigidity in the
formal sector and the credit constraints facing the informal sector.
Again, we allow a proportion of all households 1 ¡ ¸ to be Ricardian and ¸ to be non-
Ricardian. Those who are Ricardian consume C1;t. A proportion nF;t of their members
work h1F;t hours in the F-sector and a proportion 1 ¡ nF;t work h1I;t hours in the I-sector.
Non-Ricardian (credit-constrained) households work h2I;t hours only in the I-sector and
consume C2;t out of current wage income.
4.1 Dynamic Model
Consider ¯rst the benchmark model without labour market or ¯nancial frictions. Ricardian
households are described by the following utility function





1F;t + (1 ¡ nF;t)L
%(1¡¾)
1I;t ) ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾
which is a generalization of (1). As before we need their marginal utilities os consumption
and leisure given respectively by
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17Then consumption-savings and labour supply (hours worked) decisions are given by






; i = I;F (50)
h1i;t ´ 1 ¡ L1i;t ; i = I;F (51)
Equation (49) is the Euler consumption function for Ricardian households. Equation (50)
equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure with the real
wage, the relative price of leisure, and (51) de¯nes hours worked for members of the house-
hold working in each sector.
Non-Ricardian households consume out of current wage income and are described by









L2I;t ´ 1 ¡ h2I;t
Then total per capita consumption is given by
Ct = (1 ¡ ¸)C1;t + ¸C2;t
and this completes the household sector of the model.
There are informal and formal wholesale and retail sectors. Let Ni;t be the total labour
supply to sector i = I;F. Then the wholesale sectors each produce a homogeneous good
using the technology
Y W
i;t = F(Ai;t;ni;t;hi;t;Ki;t) = (Ai;tHi;t)®iK
1¡®i
i;t
NF;t ´ (1 ¡ ¸)nF;th1F;t
NI;t ´ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ nF;t)h1I;t + ¸h2I;t
Homogeneous wholesale output is converted into a di®erentiated good m according to
Yi;t(m) = (1 ¡ ci)Yi;t(m)W
Wholesale ¯rms employ labour up to the point where the marginal product of labour equals















18This allows for the possibility of some tax incidence in the informal sector, but in fact we
proceed on the basis on the informal sector is untaxed, so ¿I;t = 0.
Introducing labour market frictions, we assume that the real wage in the formal sector




= RWt = (1 + rw)
WI;t
Pt
; rw > 0
From RWt >
WI;t
Pt , it follows from ULL < 0 that the household will choose less leisure and
more work e®ort in the formal sector; i.e., hF;t > hI;F.
Capital is accumulated by capital-producing ¯rms out of F-output as before. Again we
model the risk premium by introducing ¯nancial accelerators in each sector with di®erent
parameters.
The remaining di®erence to be considered is the demand side of the model. We construct



















w(PF;t)1¡¹ + (1 ¡ w)(PI;t)1¡¹¤ 1
1¡¹ (53)
where ¹ is the elasticity of substitution between I and F goods, and w is the relative
weight of consumers in their preferences. Then standard inter-temporal and intra-temporal
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where ¦i;t, i = I;F and ¦t are sector and CPI in°ation rates respectively. We assume that
19government services are provided by the formal sector. Then output equilibrium in both
sectors is given by
YF;t = CF;t + Gt + It
YI;t = CI;t
The pricing dynamics in the two sectors follows as before, as do the shock processes, but
now we have mark-up, technology and risk premia shocks in both sectors. The model is
closed with an in°ation targeting rule for CPI in°ation. The full model is summarized in
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Figure 1: Two-Sector NK Model Structure
4.2 Bayesian Estimation for India
The model discussed above introduces further transmission mechanisms that may be im-
portant for the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, we now assess how well this extended
model ¯ts the data for India. Note that we now have several structural parameters de¯ned
for both the formal and informal sectors. In particular, we wish to ascertain the di®erences
20between the two sectors in terms of labour intensity (®F and ®I), the degree of price stick-
iness (»F and »I), market power (³F and ³I), the elasticity of substitution between goods
in the formal and informal sectors (¹), the degree of real wage rigidity (rW), the size of the
informal sector (w, relY and reln), and ¯nancial frictions (ÂF and ÂI, nkF and nkI, »e
F and
»e
I). We also allow for sector-speci¯c technology and mark-up shocks, and we attempt to
estimate the relative size of the informal sector.
In terms of priors for the new set of parameters, we maintain those used for the aggregate
economy model estimated in the previous section. In terms of the size of the informal
sector, given by 1¡w, for which we have no prior information, we estimate a dimensionless
quantity: the relative nominal outputs for the two sectors relY instead of estimating w. We
normalize AI = AF = 1:0 and choose prior means (that will hit reln = 0:2 approximately),
of rw = 0:75, relY = 1:0, ®F = 0:6 and ®I = 0:8. See Appendix B for more details on
the calibration and prior settings of the parameters related to the size of informality. For
the additional parameter ¹, we assume a normal prior centred around 1.5 with a standard
deviation of 0.2. On the other hand, we impose a beta distribution centred at 0.75 for the
degree of wage rigidities rW, with a standard deviation of 0.1. Note that the model depends
on other parameters, which we calibrate, namely a sector-speci¯c ¯nancial accelerator risk
premium (£F and £I), the latter ¯xed at 1.06, as one would expect a higher risk premium
associated with the informal sector.13
The posterior estimates and con¯dence intervals for this model are presented in the right-
most column of Table 3. The two bottom lines of Table 3 report the log marginal likelihood
and posterior model probabilities comparing the three models under study. A striking
result is the substantial improvement in ¯t achieved by the two-sector model over the
simpler ¯nancial frictions model. Indeed, the di®erence in the log likelihoods is remarkable,
lending unequivocal support to the third model compared with the second and very strong
support for the second compared with the ¯rst.14
The model also produces other interesting results. In terms of the formal-informal
dichotomy, the data is informative about the size of the informal sector as the relative
nominal outputs for the two sectors is 1.15 (implying that the weight on informality is 70%
i.e. 1 ¡ w) and the relative numbers of workers employed in the formal sector are 0.28,
which gives us a rather lower estimate for the size relative to our prior assumptions, but
still consistent with much of the evidence on informality in India. In addition, we learn
that the shock processes are more persistent and more volatile in the informal sector, which
seems a plausible outcome. Likewise, the estimated model indicates that the informal sector
is more labour intensive, as ®I is larger than ®F.
13See Haugen (2005) for some empirical support for this prior.
14Using pi = p1BF(i;1) and (38) the model probabilities calculated from the estimated posterior distri-
bution are 0:9959, 0:0039 and 0:0003 for the third, second and ¯rst model respectively. According to Je®reys
(1961) this constitutes \decisive evidence" in favour of the third over the second model, and \strong to very
strong evidence" of the second over the ¯rst { see Dejong and Dave (2007), chapter 9 for a useful discussion
of model comparison.
21In terms of the ¯nancial friction mechanisms, di®erences are less marked. Although the
model correctly points to a higher entrepreneurs survival rate and a lower leverage ratio
in the formal sector, the parameter Â is somewhat larger in the formal sector, but not
statistically di®erent from the informal economy case.
One interesting aspect revealed by these estimates is that prices are estimated to be a
lot stickier in the formal sector, with an estimated frequency of price adjustments around
4 quarters, while it remains low for the informal sector, consistent with the estimates
obtained previously. This suggests that prices in the informal sector are more °exible.
However, the model con¯rms that there is a sizeable degree of wage rigidities, with the
estimated rW close to our prior. On the other hand, the estimated parameters capturing
the policy response to in°ation largely con¯rm that the RBI appears to be quite aggressive
in preempting in°ationary pressures, particularly expected future in°ation. Indeed, µ is
again higher than 2, with a somewhat lower Á. The policy horizons are again estimated to
be on the short-term side, approximately 1 quarter.
Another distinct feature of these new estimates concerns the size of the standard er-
ror for the government spending shock. While most of the shocks appear to be of the
same magnitude as before, this model suggests that a great deal more volatility is is being
transmitted by the ¯scal side of the economy. One possible explanation is that all sorts of
exogenous uncertainty, and potential misspeci¯cations (particularly on the demand side)
are being picked up by this shock process. Note that we do not explicitly model ¯scal
policy and we have circumscribed our analysis to the closed economy case. All in all, this
suggests that careful modelling of ¯scal policy and the open economy might be required to
understand this result better.
5 Empirical Applications
After having shown the model estimates and the assessment of relative model ¯t to its other
rivals with di®erent restrictions, we use them to investigate a number of key macroeconomic
issues in India. The model favoured in the space of competing models may still be poor (po-
tentially misspeci¯ed) in capturing the important dynamics in the data. To further evaluate
the absolute performance of one particular model against data, it is necessary to compare
the model's implied characteristics with those of the actual data. Also in this section, we
address the following questions: (i) can the models capture the underlying characteristics of
the actual data? (ii) what are the driving forces of the observed business cycle °uctuations?
(iii) what are the impacts of the structural shocks on the main macroeconomic time series?
5.1 Further Model Validation
Summary statistics such as ¯rst and second moments have been standard as means of
validating models in the literature on DSGE models, especially in the RBC tradition. As
the Bayes factors (or posterior model odds) are used to assess the relative ¯t amongst a
22number of competing models, the question of comparing the moments is whether the models
correctly predict population moments, such as the variables' volatility or their correlation,
i.e. to assess the absolute ¯t of a model to macroeconomic data. In practice, one could
compute a Taylor approximation around the computed steady state of order one or two (for
a model that is not log-linearized). By computing approximated (Taylor) decision rules and
transition equations (the equations listing current values of the endogenous variables of the
model as a function of the previous state of the model and current shocks) for the model
by a perturbation method. At this stage, one could simulate the model and compute
the simulated moments by assuming that the shocks follow a normal distribution. In
what follows, all theoretical moments, correlation and autocorrelation coe±cients, impulse
responses and variance decomposition are computed based on the solutions of estimated
models of order one.
5.2 Standard Moment Criteria
To assess the contributions of assuming di®erent speci¯cations in our estimated models, we
compute some selected second moments and present the results in this subsection. Tables
4 and 5 present the second moments implied by the above estimations and compares with
those in the actual data. In particular, we compute these model-implied statistics by solving
the models at the posterior means obtained from estimation. The results of the model's
second moments are compared with the second moments in the actual data to evaluate the
models' empirical performance.
First it is interesting to note that the data exhibit higher volatility in real GDP and
real investment for the US than for India. There are two reasons for this: i) the sample size
used for the US (1980:1-2006:4) is more than twice as large as that used for India (1996:1-
2008:4); ii) in the data transformation process in Section 2.5.2 we extract the cyclical
components in GDP and investment using di®erent ¯lters for the US and Indian data.
The di®erences in volatility are due to the ¯lter used as each di®erent ¯lter extracts cycles
with properties statistically di®erent from each other. The magnitude of the standard
deviations in the transformed data is a®ected by the choice of de-trending ¯lters. The
relatively larger standard deviation in the US data occurs because a linear de-trending
¯lter does not remove entirely the low frequencies from the spectral density representation,
and leaves in the spectrum a large portion of persistent °uctuations (see Ferroni (2010) and
Section 6 for more discussions on data-¯ltering).
For the moment analysis in this subsection, we focus on the Indian economy. In terms of
the standard deviations, almost all models generate relative high volatility compared to the
actual data (except for the interest rate). By providing a feedback from the shocks to net
worth, the ¯nancial accelerator increases the volatilities of output and investment. In°ation
volatility is practically unchanged owing to the higher responsiveness (and volatility) of the
interest rate. Overall, the estimated models are able to reproduce acceptable volatility for
the main variables of the DSGE model. The in°ation volatilities implied by the models are
23close to that of the data. In line with the Bayesian model comparison, the NK models with
¯nancial frictions ¯t the data better in terms of implied volatilities of in°ation and interest
rate, getting closer to the data in this dimension. Note that our `best' 2-sector model
clearly outperforms the other two models in capturing the volatilities of output, in°ation
and interest rate and does extremely well at matching the in°ation volatility in the data.
Table 5 also reports the cross-correlations of the four observable variables vis-a-vis
output. All models perform successfully in generating the positive contemporaneous cor-
relations observed in the data. It is worth noting that our `preferred' model, 2-sector NK
model, does very well at capturing the contemporaneous cross-correlation of the interest
rate and output, suggesting that the ¯nancial accelerator and informal sector help ¯tting
the Indian data in this dimension. The 2-sector NK model appears to match well the
autocorrelations (order=1) of interest rate and investment. Using this model, output is
more autocorrelated while in°ation seems to be less autocorrelated then those in the data
at order 1. Nevertheless, the 2-sector NK model, in general, is able to capture the main
features of the data in most dimensions and strengthens the argument that the presence of
¯nancial friction mechanisms and informality is supported by the data.
5.3 Unconditional Autocorrelations
To further illustrate how the estimated models capture the data statistics, we plot the
unconditional autocorrelations of the actual data and those of the endogenous variables
generated by the model variants in Figure 9. In general, all models match reasonably
well the autocorrelations of output, interest rate and investment shown in the data within
a shorter period horizon. The data report that these three variables are positively and
very signi¯cantly autocorrelated over short horizons. At lags of one-two quarters, all the
estimated models are able to generate the observed autocorrelations of interest rate and
investment as noted above. Output is more autocorrelated in all models than in the data,
but the 2-sector model with informality gets closer to the data towards the end of sample
period. When it comes to matching in°ation, all models exhibit the shortcoming of the
inability of predicting the dynamics in the data.
Of particular interest is that, when assuming informality and/or the presence of ¯nancial
frictions, the implied autocorrelograms produced by the 2-sector model and NK model
with FA ¯t well the observed autocorrelation of interest rate, while the simplest NK model
generates less sluggishness and is less able to match the autocorrelation observed in the
data from the second lag onwards. The 2-sector model outperforms in terms of getting
closer to the autocorrelation observed in the Indian GDP and investment. Overall, the
results in this exercise generally show again that the estimated DSGE models are able to
capture the some important features of Indian data and the presence of ¯nancial frictions
and informality helps improve the model ¯t to data.
245.4 Variance Decomposition of Business Cycle Fluctuations
This section investigates the contribution of each of the structural shocks to the forecast
error variance of the observable variables in the models, i.e. the underlying sources of
°uctuations, at various horizons. The results are based on the models' posterior distribution
reported in Table 3. The focus of this exercise is on our `preferred' 2-sector NK model and
the results are summarized in Table 8.
In the short run, within a year (t=1,4), movements in real GDP are primarily driven
by supply-side shocks (with the dominant in°uence of around 60%). For instance, most of
the unexpected output °uctuations are mainly explained by the technology shock in the
informal sector (around 50%) and the price mark-up shock in the informal sector (around
3-7%). For the shocks that are associated to demand innovations, the government spending
shock together with the risk premium shock account for about 30-40% of the output forecast
error variance at the one-year horizon.
Not surprisingly, in the medium run the supply shocks and the risk premium shock
together continue to dominate, and the government spending shock also explains around
22% of India's output variability. In the long run, the technology shock a®ecting the
informal sector, the exogenous spending shock and the risk premium shock dominate, but
the contribution of technology shock a®ecting the informal sector to output variability
seems to become smaller from medium to long run and the risk premium shock seems to
explain a bigger part of the long-run variations in output. In contrast, the monetary policy
shock and mark-up shock in the formal sector do not seem to matter for output variability,
regardless of forecast horizon.
Under the estimated interest rate, we ¯nd that the main determinant of the nominal
interest rate in India is the risk premium shock, which explains around 46% to 76% of its
forecast error variance from the short run to the long run. The second largest component
is the government spending shock within a year (25%) and the productivity shock in the
informal sector and in the short run (around 20%). This ¯nding highlights the important
role of productivity factors over the informal sector in the Indian economy. Interestingly,
the shock that explains most of CPI in°ation variance is the monetary policy shock. We
¯nd that it is by far the most dominant in°uence to the in°ation variability (over 70%) at
all forecast horizons. In contrast, our estimated 2-sector NK model shows that in°ation
°uctuations are almost una®ected by either the productivity shock a®ecting the formal
sector or price mark-up shocks and there are only limited e®ects on in°ation from the
informal productivity shock and various demand shocks. One reason for this is, according
to Smets and Wouters (2007), that the estimated slope of the NK Phillips curve is very
small (in particular in the formal sector), so that only large and persistent changes in the
marginal cost will have an impact on in°ation. Finally, the risk premium and government
spending shocks together explain the largest part of investment in both the short run and
the long run.
25It can also be seen in Tables 6 and 7 that the contributions of the selected shocks
to the forecast error variance of the endogenous variables are broadly similar across the
three models (especially between the models characterizing ¯nancial frictions). Perhaps one
noteworthy discrepancy is exhibited by the contributions of the price mark-up shock to the
variations in output implied by the NK model with ¯nancial frictions. The estimated model
suggests that this shock has a noticeable e®ect on output, dominating the productivity
shock.
Overall, the results show that the supply-side shocks account for some of the long-run
variance which is in line with the business cycle literature and identi¯ed VAR studies in both
industrialized and developing economies. The disturbances from government expenditures
and the risk premium shock are very important at explaining the dynamics of macro-
variables in the Indian economy. Finally the technological disturbances and price mark-up
shock from the informal sector in India are more noticeable than these shocks a®ecting the
formal sector. The ¯ndings in this analysis are consistent with our estimation results of
2-sector model reported in Table 3. In particular, the properties of all our estimation results
clearly indicate a signi¯cant presence of informality in the observed data. In this section
we show that the disturbances in the informal sector have a much greater impact on the
dynamics of the economy, further highlighting the important role of informal sector over
the Indian economy. Moreover, Table 8 shows that the exogenous government spending
shock contributes noticeable fractions of forecast variances of output, interest rate and
investment and the estimated model suggests that a great deal more volatility is being
transmitted persistently by the ¯scal side of the Indian economy.
5.5 Posterior Impulse Response Analysis
We now compare the impulse response functions (IRFs) implied by the estimated models, in
order to investigate the importance of each of the shocks to the dynamics of the endogenous
variables. Figures 4 to 8 plot the deterministic mean responses corresponding to a positive
one standard deviation of each shock's innovation. The IRFs show the quarterly percentage
changes to the relevant variables about the their steady-state values. In the 2-sector model,
we con¯ne the analysis to shocks to productivity, the price mark-up and the risk premium
in the formal sector and output, investment, hours worked, marginal costs refer to that
sector. In°ation refers to CPI in°ation. Given our speci¯cation of real wage determination
in the formal sector, percentage changes to the real wage are the same in the two sectors.
Before we compare the IRFs in the simple NK model I, the one-sector model II and
two-sector model III both with ¯nancial frictions, the di®erences between the estimated
Taylor rules should be noted. There is a similar degree of interest rate smoothing and
degrees of forward-looking and backward-looking behaviour across all models, but the rules
are far more aggressive in their response to CPI in°ation in models II and III. This means
that in comparing the IRFs, we are not making a simple comparison between models with
or without ¯nancial frictions and informality.
26A positive productivity shock in the formal-sector leads to the usual positive impact
on output, consumption, Tobin's Q (the price of capital) and investment. CPI in°ation
falls and, with our in°ation-targeting Taylor rule in place, the nominal interest rate falls.
This looser monetary policy stance after a lag leads to a prolonged period with the real
interest rate below its steady state, so demand for consumption rises in line with supply.
There are marked di®erences between model I on the one hand and models II and III
with ¯nancial frictions. The latter, we recall, consist of the introduction of some credit
constrained households and a ¯nancial accelerator.
Consider the labour market and the behaviour of the real wage. With sticky prices, the
increase in demand for output is less than the 1 percent technology increase, so the demand
for labour falls shifting the demand curve in (real-wage, quantity) space inwards. This puts
an initial downward pressure on the real wage. On the supply-side of the labour market,
since the marginal utility of consumption for the household falls as consumption rises, there
is an increase in leisure (a reduction in hours) shifting the supply of labour curve outward,
thus tending to raise the real wage. With liquidity constrained households consuming out
of their wage income in models II and III, this boosts consumption and output further and
shifts the demand curve back outwards. This liquidity e®ect dominates and we see hours
worked stay almost at their steady state and the real wage rising in the two models with
this feature. The marginal cost (the real price of wholesale output) moves with the factor
costs: both costs of capital and labour fall in model I, but these more or less cancel out in
models II and III leaving the marginal cost almost unchanged. With informality in model
III, the positive productivity shock in the formal-sector leads to a fall in the relative price
of output in that sector (a rise in
PI;t
PF;t in the ¯gure). Changes in the terms of trade between
the two sectors acts as a stabilizing cushion for investment, consumption, the real wage
and Tobin's Q in rather the same way as the real exchange rate in a multi-country context.
This we shall see is a feature in several of the IRFs reported.
Turning to the responses to a government spending shock, the striking feature is the
presence of a `classical' crowding-out e®ect. Indeed, the initial ¯scal stimulus increases
in°ation, leading to an aggressive rise in the interest rate, which provokes a fall in private
consumption and investment. This e®ect if signi¯cantly ampli¯ed in the presence of ¯nancial
frictions and informality. On the other hand, a shock to the policy rule implies a signi¯cant
reduction in the in°ation rate, having positive real e®ects in terms of private investment
and output.
There are now marked di®erences between models I and II on the one hand and models
III with informality. Consider the labour market and the behaviour of the real wage. The
increase in demand for output leads to a corresponding increase in supply and demand for
labour { the demand for labour curve shifts outwards, putting an upward pressure on the
real wage. The crowding-out of consumption results in a fall in consumption and a rise in
its marginal utility; households reduce their leisure and increase hours shifting the supply
curve inwards and putting downward pressure on the real wage. The liquidity e®ect means
27this reduces the consumption further and shifts the demand for labour back somewhat.
The latter two e®ects cancel out the direct demand e®ect for model II and dominates for
model III. This is driven by the quite small di®erences in the policy rules for models II and
III which result in a tighter stance for model III, a higher real interest rate change and a
sharp fall in consumption of Ricardian consumers. Hours worked and the real wage fall in
the formal sector. There is now an important terms of trade e®ect. The concentration of
the demand shock in the formal sector causes the relative rise of its output to rise, shifting
demand to the informal sector. This squeezes investment (which comes entirely from the
formal sector) further and it falls signi¯cantly more than in one-sector models I and II.
The monetary shock IRFs can largely be explained in terms of the di®erent estimated
rules. The positive shock to the nominal interest rate drives down in°ation. In the more
aggressive Taylor rules in models II and III this triggers a compensating strong downward
adjustment to the interest rate, which now hardly moves from its steady state. The real
interest rate in model I stays positive for several periods, diverging sharply from the other
two models. Investment and Tobin's Q consequently fall. Consumption and investment
demand are lower in model III and therefore output is as well. Since investment is formed
entirely from the output of the formal sector, there is a shift in demand away from the
formal sector and its terms of trade (the relative price
PI;t
PF;t in the ¯gure) falls.
The price mark-up shock (in the formal sector for model III) perhaps produces the
most interesting IRFs, in that they di®er signi¯cantly across all three models. For all three
models a positive price mark-up shock lowers demand for output (in the informal sector for
the case of model III) and demand for labour shift inwards. The real wage falls and with it
the marginal cost, o®setting the original shock. Monetary policy is contractionary in model
I: both the nominal and real interest rate rises in response to the rise in the in°ation rate,
pushing the consumption of Ricardian households down, reducing investment and causing
Tobin's Q to fall. In model II the fall in the real wage results in a drop in the consumption
on non-Ricardian households, reducing demand for labour further and adding to the output
fall. The marginal cost fall further o®setting the original in°ation shock, so now in°ation
falls resulting now in a expansionary monetary response; both the nominal and real interest
rate rises, now raising investment and causing Tobin's Q to rise. In model III the informal
sector acts as a bu®er, absorbing workers who are no longer employed in the formal sector
and this dampens the output, consumption and hours worked e®ects seen in models I and
II. The CPI in°ation rate now includes informal sector in°ation, which is directly a®ected
by the shock. The monetary stance therefore lies between those for models I and II as do
the investment and Tobin's Q paths.
A common risk premium shock in both sectors directly increases the cost of capital
and this is ampli¯ed by the ¯nancial accelerator. Investment, output and Tobin's Q all
fall. The demand for labour curve shifts inwards and hours worked fall. In model I the
monetary stance is on average over 10 periods slightly contractionary, so Ricardian house-
holds save less and consume more. The more aggressive rules for models II and III see a
28more contractionary monetary stance so investment and Tobin's Q fall by less. Aggregate
consumption includes that of entrepreneurs in models II and III and their fall in net worth
sees consumption fall sharply in these two models and this reduces output demand still
further. The main di®erences in IRFs for the risk premium shock is then between model I
without a ¯nancial accelerator and models II and III which have this feature.
6 Discussion and Future Developments: Open Economy
and Policy
In this chapter, we put forward a methodology to help understanding of India's business
cycle. Though well rooted in the empirical New Keynesian DSGE framework, we discuss
a number of novel features that address issues that are emerging-economies (and India, for
that matter) speci¯c. Indeed, the introduction of, on one hand, ¯nancial frictions in the
form of liquidity constrained consumers and a ¯nancial accelerator mechanism, and, on the
other hand, the distinction between a formal and an informal sector are not only realistic,
but also conducive to a better empirical performance.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to our study. First, we believe that in the case of
emerging economies, the role of trends in the data requires special attention. Andrle (2008),
for example, argues that assumptions on trending behaviour should be explicitly modelled,
rather than side-stepped by means of an ad-hoc ¯ltering procedure. Alternatively, one can
take an agnostic view regarding de-trending in DSGE models by following the one-step
approach recently suggested by Ferroni (2010), in which ¯ltering parameters are jointly es-
timated with structural parameters, thus allowing for formal statistical comparisons among
di®erent de-trending procedures.
Second, by con¯ning our analysis to a closed-economy model, we leave out important
sources of °uctuations. As with any open economy, emerging market economies are a®ected
by external shocks. In addition, they are also vulnerable to sudden and sharp reversals
of capital in°ows, the \sudden stops" highlighted in Calvo (1998). Understanding these
di®erences and carefully modeling the transmission mechanism of internal and external
shocks is crucial to the understanding of real business cycle °uctuations and the design of
stabilization policy.
In a series of papers, Batini et al. (2007), Batini et al. (2009) and Batini et al. (2010a),
the authors develop a two-bloc model of an emerging open economy interacting with the rest
of the world. The Indian economy is small in relation to the world economy and is therefore
treated as a small open economy. Alongside standard features of small open economies
(SOE) such as a combination of producer and local currency pricing for exporters and oil
imports, their model incorporates ¯nancial frictions in the form of a ¯nancial accelerator,
where capital ¯nancing is partly or totally in foreign currency, as in Gertler et al. (2003)
and Gilchrist (2003). This intensi¯es the exposure of a SOE to internal and external
shocks in a manner consistent with the stylized facts listed above. In addition, they allow
29for liability dollarization and liquidity-constrained households, which further amplify the
e®ects of ¯nancial stress. In Batini et al. (2010a) they then focus on monetary policy
analysis, calibrating (but not estimating as in this paper) the model using data for India
and the US economy.
Many emerging economies conduct their monetary and ¯scal policy according to the
`three pillars macroeconomic policy framework': a combination of a freely °oating exchange
rate, an explicit target for in°ation over the medium run, and a mechanism that ensures a
stable government debt-GDP ratio around a speci¯ed long run, but may allow for counter-
cyclical adjustments of the ¯scal de¯cit over the business cycle. By contrast, the currency
monetary policy stance of the Indian Reserve Bank intervenes in the foreign exchange
market to prevent what it regards as excessive volatility of the exchange rate. On the
¯scal side, Central Government has a rigid ¯scal de¯cit target of 3% of GDP irrespective
of whether the economy is in boom or recession, see Shah (2008). The framework adopted
in the papers cited allow one to contrast these implied policy prescriptions for interest rate
rules.
There is now a growing literature that compares alternative monetary policy regimes in
their ability to stabilize emerging economies when faced with shocks and ¯nancial frictions.
Some papers close to ours include Gertler et al. (2003), Cespedes et al. (2004), Cook (2004),
Devereux et al. (2006) and Curdia (2008). All these papers con¯rm the result in Batini et al.
(2010a) and in their other cited papers that °exible exchange rate regimes outperform a
peg. Only Curdia (2008) compares these regimes with the optimal policy, but circumscribed
to a deterministic exercise in which optimal policy is designed following a sudden stop. By
contrast the rules examined in the Batini et al papers are optimal or, the case of simple
rules optimized within the category or rule in anticipation of a range of future stochastic
shocks. An important feature of their work is the introduction of a zero lower bound into
the construction of policy rules.
Finally, future modelling developments will combine these open economy features with
the introduction of a large informal sector as in this paper. We will then estimate the
model by Bayesian-Maximum-Likelihood methods.15 In doing so we will confront the data
limitations associated especially with the informal and partly hidden economy by adopting
a consistent partial information assumption for the econometrician and private sector alike,
as in Justiniano et al. (2008).
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A Summary of One-Sector Model
A.1 Dynamic Model
The following summarizes the dynamic model for both one-sector models of sections 2 and
3. Note that the baseline model in section 2 puts ¸ = 0 and shuts down the ¯nancial
accelerator.
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A.2 Steady State
The steady state now changes to
¹ Nt =
(1 ¡ »e) ¹ Dt
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We obtain Â from econometric studies and we have data on the risk premium £ =
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Then in the baseline steady state used to calibrate parameters, we put ¹ Nt = nk ¹ Kt and
calibrate ¹ D from (A.1). Then the zero-in°ation steady state and the calibrated k are given
by
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B Summary of two-Sector Model
B.1 Dynamic Model
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¹ Gt = nFhF ¹ ¿F;t + nIhI¹ ¿I;t
¹ ¿i;t = ¿i ¹ Wi;t ; i = F;I
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39where consumption, technical LAP, the real wage and tax rates, and government spending
(all indicated by ¹ Xt) are growing at a common growth rate.
There are three parameters AF;AI and w that are dependent on the units chosen and
therefore cannot be calibrated nor estimated. By choice of units of labour in both sectors,
and units of capital and labour, we can normalize AF = AI = 1. Then instead of estimating
w for which we can have no priors we estimate a dimensionless quantity: the relative nominal
















































so we can solve for w as a post-recursive variable. This completes the speci¯cation of the
model which now includes relY as a parameter to be estimated, which has been switched
with w which is now an endogenous variable in the steady state.
We can also use data for the the relative numbers of workers employed in the formal
sector reln given in the model by
reln =
(1 ¡ ¸)nF
(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ nF) + ¸
(B.3)
From Marjit and Kar (2008) we learn that in 2001 80% workers in industry were informal
and they contributed 28% to GDP. This implies reln = 0:25 and relY = 2:6 implying
a formal-informal labour productivity ratio of around 10:1. Sen and Kolli (2009) suggest
estimates reln = 0:1 and relY = 1:1 implying a slightly higher productivity ratio 1:11. Rada
(2009) provide estimates reln = 0:075. relY = 0:68 implying a slightly lower productivity
ratio 1:9.16
The question is: how can the model be calibrated to reproduce this high productivity
gap? There are two parameters we can vary that increase the size of the informal sector and
reduce its marginal product of labour: the mark-up of the real wage in the formal sector
over that in the informal sector, rw, and labour shares in production, ®I and ®I. Figure
2 puts ®F = 0:6 < ®I = 0:8 and varies rw, Figure 3 puts ®F = 0:5 < ®I = 0:8 and again
16This productivity gap seems very high. Ila Patnaik has pointed out that the informal sector employment
numbers may be exaggerated as they include all household members, employed or otherwise, in the household
sector. As a ¯rst attempt we therefore choose priors reln = 0:2, relY = 1 implying a productivity ratio of
1:5.
40varies rw. If we take reln = 0:2 we have three possibilities to hit this value: for ®F = 0:6,
relY = 1:0 and rw = 0:75; for ®F = 0:5 either relY = 1:0 and rw = 0:47 or relY = 1:5
and rw = 0:9. In the estimation we choose priors of rw = 0:75, relY = 1:0, ®F = 0:6 and
®I = 0:8.






















Figure 2: Calibration of rw to fit reln. ®F = 0:6





















Figure 3: Calibration of rw to fit reln. ®F = 0:5
41C Tables and Figures
Calibrated parameter Symbol Value for India Value for US
Discount factor ¯ 0.9823 0.99
Depreciation rate ± 0.025 0.025
Formal sector FA risk premium £F 1.012 -
Informal sector FA risk premium £I 1.06 -
Investment adjustment cost parameter ÁX 2.00 2.00
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Notation Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Density Mean S.D/df NK Model}
Risk aversion ¾ Normal 1.50 0.375 1.85 [1.31:2.33]
Calvo prices » Beta 0.50 0.10 0.67 [0.61:0.74]
Labour share ® Normal 0.70 0.05 0.58 [0.52:0.64]
Preference parameter % Beta 0.50 0.15 0.79 [0.70:0.88]
Substitution elasticity (varieties) ³ Normal 7.00 0.50 7.17 [6.40:8.02]
Interest rate rule
Interest rate smoothing ½ Beta 0.75 0.10 0.60 [0.55:0.66]
Feedback from expected in°ation µ Normal 1.50 0.25 1.44 [1.06:1.77]
Feedback from past in°ation Á Normal 0.50 0.05 0.45 [0.37:0.53]
Degree of forward-lookingness ' Beta 0.50 0.20 0.93 [0.89:0.97]
Degree of backward-lookingness ¿ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.11 [0.02:0.19]
AR(1) coe±cient
Technology ½A Beta 0.50 0.20 0.65 [0.43:0.85]
Government spending ½G Beta 0.50 0.20 0.92 [0.89:0.95]
Price mark-up ½MS Beta 0.50 0.20 0.92 [0.88:0.96]
Risk premium ½RPS Beta 0.50 0.20 0.70 [0.65:0.77]
Standard deviation of AR(1) innovations/I.I.D. shocks
Technology sd(²A) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00 0.09 [0.02:0.15]
Government spending sd(²G) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00 3.72 [3.44:4.00]
Price mark-up sd(²MS) Inv. gamma 1.16 2.00 1.53 [1.16:1.92]
Risk premium sd(²RPS) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00 2.10 [1.31:2.85]
Monetary policy sd(²MPS) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00 0.25 [0.22:0.28]
Price contract length 1
1¡» 2.56
Table 2: Priors and Posterior Estimates - US Economy
} Notes: we report posterior means and 95% probability intervals (in parentheses) based on the
output of the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm. Sample range: 1980:I to 2006:IV.
42Parameter Notation Prior distribution Posterior distribution}
Density Mean S.D/df NK Model NK Model with FA 2-sector NK Model
Risk aversion ¾ Normal 2.00 0.50 2.14 [1.40:2.92] 1.62 [0.74:2.43] 1.99 [1.33:2.69]
Calvo prices (F)z »F Beta 0.75 0.15 0.57 [0.45:0.69] 0.39 [0.26:0.51] 0.75 [0.57:0.95]
Calvo prices (I) »I Beta 0.75 0.15 - - 0.30 [0.15:0.43]
Labour share (F) ®F Beta 0.60 0.10 - - 0.68 [0.60:0.76]
Labour share (I) ®=®I Beta 0.80 0.10 0.62 [0.47:0.76] 0.78 [0.69:0.88] 0.74 [0.61:0.87]
Preference parameter % Beta 0.50 0.20 0.40 [0.22:0.58] 0.25 [0.12:0.37] 0.22 [0.10:0.31]
Substitution elasticity (varieties, F) ³F Normal 7.00 0.50 7.01 [6.17:7.79] 6.96 [6.12:7.75] 7.02 [6.21:7.81]
Substitution elasticity (varieties, I) ³I Normal 7.00 0.50 - - 7.00 [6.17:7.82]
Substitution Elasticity (F/I goods) ¹ Normal 1.50 0.20 - - 1.45 [1.13:1.76]
Degree of Labour market frictions rW Beta 0.75 0.10 - - 0.78 [0.64:0.92]
GDP Contribution relY ´ PFYF
PIYI Normal 1.00 0.50 - - 1.15 [0.67:1.64]
Financial accelerator/RT consumers
External ¯nance premium elasticity (F) ÂF Inv. gamma 0.05 4.00 - 0.03 [0.01:0.05] 0.05 [0.01:0.10]
External ¯nance premium elasticity (I) ÂI Inv. gamma 0.05 4.00 - - 0.03 [0.01:0.05]
Inverse of Leverage (F) nkF Beta 0.50 0.15 - 0.58 [0.41:0.74] 0.53 [0.29:0.75]
Inverse of Leverage (I) nkI Beta 0.50 0.15 - - 0.61 [0.39:0.81]
Entrepreneurs survival rate (F) »eF Beta 0.93 0.05 - 0.93 [0.88:0.96] 0.90 [0.88:0.98]
Entrepreneurs survival rate (I) »eI Beta 0.93 0.05 - - 0.89 [0.84:0.95]
Proportion of RT consumers ¸ Beta 0.40 0.10 - 0.21 [0.11:0.29] 0.30 [0.19:0.43]
Interest rate rule
Interest rate smoothing ½ Beta 0.75 0.10 0.81 [0.70:0.92] 0.79 [0.66:0.92] 0.80 [0.68:0.93]
Feedback from expected in°ation µ Normal 2.00 1.00 1.64 [0.31:3.14] 2.42 [0.83:3.89] 2.40 [1.09:3.53]
Feedback from past in°ation Á Normal 2.00 1.00 0.52 [-0.09:1.14] 1.64 [0.48:2.86] 1.00 [0.15:1.76]
Degree of forward-lookingness ' Beta 0.50 0.20 0.51 [0.17:0.83] 0.42 [0.13:0.72] 0.50 [0.21:0.78]
Degree of backward-lookingness ¿ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.47 [0.10:0.86] 0.46 [0.11:0.84] 0.50 [0.15:0.88]
AR(1) coe±cient
Technology (F) ½AF Beta 0.75 0.10 0.60 [0.46:0.74] 0.73 [0.61:0.85] 0.72 [0.58:0.88]
Technology (I) ½AI Beta 0.75 0.10 - - 0.70 [0.56:0.84]
Government spending ½G Beta 0.75 0.10 0.66 [0.56:0.77] 0.82 [0.71:0.92] 0.79 [0.81:0.87]
Price mark-up (F) ½MSF Beta 0.75 0.10 0.69 [0.52:0.87] 0.68 [0.53:0.83] 0.73 [0.57:0.89]
Price mark-up (I) ½MSI Beta 0.75 0.10 - - 0.74 [0.59:0.91]
Risk premium ½RPS Beta 0.75 0.10 0.67 [0.58:0.75] 0.78 [0.70:0.86] 0.78 [0.69:0.87]
Standard deviation of AR(1) innovations/I.I.D. shocks
Technology (F) sd(²AF) Inv. gamma 3.00 3.00 1.78 [1.08:2.46] 1.21 [0.90:1.51] 2.09 [1.07:3.21]
Technology (I) sd(²AI) Inv. gamma 3.00 3.00 - - 1.61 [1.13:2.12]
Government spending sd(²G) Inv. gamma 3.00 3.00 7.01 [4.87:9.17] 5.78 [1.12:9.77] 21.09 [17.19:25.00]
Price mark-up (F) sd(²MSF) Inv. gamma 3.00 3.00 2.66 [0.97:4.53] 4.87 [1.21:8.31] 2.11 [1.01:3.25]
Price mark-up (I) sd(²MSI) Inv. gamma 3.00 3.00 - - 2.07 [0.99:3.16]
Risk premium sd(²RPS) Inv. gamma 3.50 3.00 3.93 [1.95:5.89] 1.94 [1.28:2.56] 1.99 [1.30:2.66]
Monetary policy sd(²MPS) Inv. gamma 3.00 3.00 1.38 [0.95:1.80] 2.77 [1.52:4.03] 1.96 [1.12:2.76]
Employment ratio? reln ´
(1¡¸)nF
(1¡¸)(1¡nF)+¸ n.a. 0.20 n.a. - - 0.28 [0.22:0.35]
Price contract length (F) 1
1¡»F 2.38 1.67 4.02
Price contract length (I) 1
1¡»I - - 1.43




















LL -358.95 -356.28 {350.73
Prob. 0.0003 0.0039 0.9959
Table 3: Priors and Posterior Estimates - Indian Economy
} Notes: we report posterior means and 95% probability intervals (in parentheses) based on the
output of the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm. Sample range: 1996:I to 2008:IV.
z F=formal sector; I=informal sector.
? The employment ratio reln has an unknown distribution and the estimated nF = 0:3153.
43Standard Deviation
Model Output In°ation Interest rate Investment
Data 2.06 0.48 0.92 8.47
NK Model 2.87 0.38 0.64 8.51
Cross-correlation with Output
Data 1.00 -0.02 0.14 0.56
NK Model 1.00 0.38 0.40 0.73
Autocorrelations (Order=1)
Data 0.91 0.85 0.94 0.95
NK Model 0.96 0.70 0.91 0.96
Table 4: Selected Second Moments - US Economy}
} All the second moments are theoretical moments computed from the model solutions (order of
approximation = 1). The results are based on the models' posterior distribution.
Standard Deviation
Model Output In°ation Interest rate Investment
Data 1.22 0.97 1.93 5.30
NK Model 2.02 1.04 1.41 7.59
NK Model with FA 2.42 1.02 1.76 8.37
2-sector NK Model 1.59 0.97 1.84 7.80
Cross-correlation with Output
Data 1.00 0.11 0.32 0.42
NK Model 1 1.00 0.27 0.05 0.50
NK Model with FA 1.00 0.14 0.44 0.46
2-sector NK Model 1.00 0.18 0.31 0.29
Autocorrelations (Order=1)
Data 0.44 0.13 0.83 0.88
NK Model 0.74 0.05 0.71 0.96
NK Model with FA 0.79 -0.23 0.82 0.96
2-sector NK Model 0.70 -0.11 0.88 0.93
Table 5: Selected Second Moments - Indian Economy
44Shocks of the Estimated DSGE Model
Forecast Observable Productivity Government Monetary Price Risk
horizon variables spending policy Mark-up premium
t=1 In°ation 23.3 28.4 42.3 5.8 0.3
Output 14.9 50.0 11.6 22.9 0.5
Interest rate 29.6 37.2 25.9 7.3 0.0
Investment 6.3 9.3 0.3 2.3 81.8
t=4 In°ation 23.1 27.8 40.5 5.8 2.8
Output 26.1 28.6 6.2 26.0 13.0
Interest rate 28.6 39.2 13.6 6.8 11.8
Investment 6.5 10.8 0.1 2.4 80.3
t=10 In°ation 23.1 27.8 40.4 5.8 2.9
Output 24.5 24.4 5.1 23.3 22.6
Interest rate 24.9 34.2 11.7 5.9 23.2
Investment 6.2 11.2 0.1 2.3 80.1
t=100 In°ation 23.1 27.8 40.4 5.78 2.9
Output 21.5 22.3 4.3 19.9 32.0
Interest rate 24.8 34.0 11.6 5.9 23.7
Investment 6.2 11.2 0.1 2.3 80.2
Table 6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - NK Model (in Percent)
Shocks of the Estimated DSGE Model
Forecast Observable Productivity Government Monetary Price Risk
horizon variables spending policy Mark-up premium
t=1 In°ation 4.2 2.5 85.8 2.5 4.9
Output 30.8 1.1 2.4 54.7 11.0
Interest rate 28.1 17.1 0.1 16.7 38.0
Investment 13.6 11.7 0.1 0.6 74.0
t=4 In°ation 4.7 2.7 85.3 2.7 4.6
Output 34.9 0.7 1.3 47.4 15.8
Interest rate 19.1 13.1 0.2 12.1 55.5
Investment 11.4 11.7 0.0 0.5 76.4
t=10 In°ation 4.7 2.7 85.3 2.7 4.6
Output 33.2 0.7 1.1 41.5 23.4
Interest rate 14.5 10.2 0.2 9.6 65.5
Investment 9.6 11.8 0.0 0.4 78.1
t=100 In°ation 4.7 2.7 85.3 2.7 4.6
Output 30.0 1.0 1.1 36.8 31.0
Interest rate 13.8 9.8 0.2 9.5 66.7
Investment 9.4 11.8 0.0 0.4 78.4
Table 7: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - NK Model with FA (in
Percent)
45Shocks of the Estimated DSGE Model
Forecast Observable Productivity Productivity Government Monetary Mark-up Mark-up Risk
horizon variables (F) (I) spending policy (F) (I) premium
t=1 In°ation 0.1 7.3 7.0 74.7 0.0 0.8 10.1
Output 3.1 47.5 34.4 3.2 0.0 3.2 8.7
Interest rate 0.6 19.9 25.5 5.3 0.0 2.1 46.5
Investment 1.2 8.2 22.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 68.0
t=4 In°ation 0.2 9.0 6.9 72.7 0.0 1.1 10.1
Output 6.7 52.9 24.3 1.9 0.0 6.7 7.5
Interest rate 0.8 7.4 20.7 2.0 0.0 0.8 68.5
Investment 1.4 5.9 28.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 65.0
t=10 In°ation 0.2 9.0 6.9 72.66 0.0 1.1 10.1
Output 7.4 48.9 21.5 1.7 0.0 7.1 13.4
Interest rate 0.6 5.2 16.5 1.6 0.0 0.7 75.4
Investment 1.5 4.3 34.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 59.0
t=100 In°ation 0.2 9.0 6.9 72.7 0.0 1.1 10.1
Output 6.9 43.5 23.4 1.7 0.1 6.4 18.1
Interest rate 0.5 4.9 15.6 1.9 0.0 0.8 76.3
Investment 1.5 4.3 35.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 58.3
Table 8: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - 2 Sector NK Model (in
Percent)}
} All the variance decomposition is computed from the model solutions (order of approximation =
1). The results are based on the models' posterior distribution.















































NK Model NK Model with FA 2−sector NK Model















Figure 4: Estimated Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock}
} Each panel plots the mean response corresponding a positive one standard deviation shock.
Each response is for a 10 quarters (2.5 years) horizon. All DSGE impulse responses are computed
simulating the vector of DSGE model parameters at the posterior mean values reported in Table 3.




























































Figure 5: Estimated Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock




























































Figure 6: Estimated Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock




























































Figure 7: Estimated Impulse Responses to a Price Mark-up Shock




























































Figure 8: Estimated Impulse Responses to a Risk Premium Shock






































data NK Model NK Model with FA 2−sector NK Model
Figure 9: Autocorrelations of Observables in the Actual Data and in the
Estimated Models
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